Stephanie Lacy October 27, 2026 • 8 min read For several years, “OSCAL-native” (OSCAL being the acronym for “Open Security Controls Assessment Language,” developed by NIST) has been used as a mark of maturity in governance, risk, and compliance (GRC)…

Stephanie Lacy
October 27, 2026 • 8 min read

For several years, “OSCAL-native” (OSCAL being the acronym for “Open Security Controls Assessment Language,” developed by NIST) has been used as a mark of maturity in governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platforms. The phrase suggests that a product is more structured, interoperable, and automation-ready than tools built around documents, spreadsheets, or proprietary data models.
That said, “OSCAL-native” is not a NIST-defined model, certification, or conformance level. It is marketing jargon.
A platform can fully support OSCAL without organizing its entire architecture around it. Conversely, a platform can call itself OSCAL-native without demonstrating that it understands, validates, or acts on the meaning of the information it stores.
This perspective comes from direct involvement in OSCAL’s development. Telos worked closely with NIST and FedRAMP as they advanced OSCAL, providing practical guidance on use cases and interoperability, and helping identify issues in formatting and requirements. Xacta
® was also an early implementer of OSCAL for FedRAMP package generation.
That experience showed both the value of standardized exchange and the limits of treating an exchange schema as platform architecture.
If OSCAL-native means comprehensive OSCAL support, the label is vague. If it means the platform’s internal data model is inseparable from OSCAL, it describes a significant design flaw: tight coupling to an external schema whose scope, models, and program usage can change.
When security data conveys meaningful information, is interpreted accurately, and directly informs strong security decisions, it is valuable. The way that data is structured, however, does not guarantee usefulness.
Being native to one schema is not the same as understanding the information it carries—or being capable of adapting when the security model changes.
OSCAL Is a Transport Layer, Not an Architecture
OSCAL defines and transports structured security information. It provides models for controls, implementations, components, assessments, findings, risks, and remediation. OSCAL is extensible, but that flexibility exists within a defined problem space. Organizations can add properties, links, references, and custom extensions. However, adding data does not automatically give it shared meaning or make it a first-class part of the standard.
Those extensions may preserve technical conformance while reducing reciprocity. Another organization may be able to parse the OSCAL document without understanding its custom vocabulary, relationships, or validation rules. The more meaning depends on those customizations, the less value the common schema provides by itself.
The schema determines what can be transported consistently. The platform determines what can be meaningfully connected, evaluated, shared, and trusted.
That transport capability is valuable. OSCAL gives organizations a common, machine-readable structure for exchanging core security information, reducing dependence on documents and enabling greater automation and reuse. In this regard, OSCAL excels within a defined scope, rather than addressing every need a security platform may have.
OMB Requires OSCAL Capability, Not OSCAL Architecture
OMB M-24-15 (OMB’s July 2024 guidance for updating FedRAMP’s scope, governance, and agency responsibilities) requires federal agencies to ensure that their GRC and system-inventory tools can produce, transmit, and ingest machine-readable authorization artifacts using OSCAL, or a succeeding format identified by FedRAMP.
The operative words are produce, transmit, and ingest. These are interface capabilities. They describe how security information must move between systems rather than how a GRC platform must organize its internal data.
That distinction allows agencies to meet OSCAL interoperability and reciprocity requirements while maintaining authorization processes suited to their own missions.
FedRAMP 20x Moves Beyond an OSCAL-Only Model
FedRAMP 20x demonstrates why this separation matters.
A Key Security Indicator (KSI) can take forms beyond security controls. Some KSI measures serve different purposes than assessment objectives, and certain historical metrics require more than an implementation statement to be accurately captured.
Collectively, FedRAMP’s Consolidated Rules and Security Decision Record address program rules, KSIs, implementation explanations, measures, verification, validation, assessment information, automation results, and historical metrics. Rather than defining these concepts as required OSCAL artifacts, FedRAMP created purpose-built JSON structures organized around the certification information it needs to receive.
This creates two distinct interoperability needs. Agencies must maintain the ability to produce, transmit, and ingest OSCAL authorization information as directed by OMB. At the same time, providers and supporting platforms must produce the separate, FedRAMP-defined JSON artifacts required for FedRAMP 20x. FedRAMP is not requiring those 20x submissions to be OSCAL, and its schemas should not be conflated with OSCAL simply because they are machine-readable JSON.
Returning to the concept of a platform based on an “OSCAL-native architecture,” by definition, such a solution must translate FedRAMP 20x concepts into an internal model designed around OSCAL and then reconstruct them in the FedRAMP-required schemas. When these concepts are misaligned, the platform must rely on extensions, custom mappings, or parallel data structures.
An OSCAL-capable platform, however, can take a broader approach. It can represent FedRAMP rules, KSIs, measures, validation, metrics, and security decisions directly, generate the FedRAMP-specific artifacts the program requires, and still produce and ingest OSCAL where agencies need it for interoperability and reciprocity.
This is the distinction: OSCAL capability satisfies an important exchange requirement. However, it does not eliminate the need to support other schemas, other requirements, or other decision models.
Different Responsibilities Require Different Models
![The difference between OSCAL-Native and OSCAL-Capable]()
NIST, FedRAMP, and federal agencies operate at different layers and answer different questions, but they share a common goal: improving security decisions through consistent, structured, and reusable information. For example: NIST develops reusable standards for representing security information; FedRAMP defines what must be demonstrated to support a cloud certification or authorization decision; and agencies determine whether a service is acceptable for their missions, systems, data, threats, and risk tolerances.
Requirements come from many sources beyond NIST and FedRAMP. Organizations often must respond to government programs, commercial frameworks, contractual obligations, internal policies, operational risk models, and emerging assurance requirements. These requirements often introduce new concepts, relationships, evidence, measures, and decision processes—many of which extend beyond what OSCAL was designed to represent as first-class objects. These layers and programs must exchange information, but they do not need identical data models. An agency may reuse FedRAMP information while requiring additional evidence, a different assessment scope, or its own ATO workflow. Another program may organize assurance around operational outcomes, threat intelligence, continuous telemetry, business risk, or measures that do not map naturally to OSCAL controls and assessments.
Extensibility and Architectural Openness Are Not the Same
Extensions remain anchored to OSCAL’s models and may require custom definitions, mappings, and validation logic that other platforms do not support. An OSCAL-capable platform can support standard OSCAL exchange without making OSCAL the boundary of what the platform can represent.
Forcing every requirement into one schema confuses interoperability with uniformity. The goal is not to make every security decision conform to OSCAL. It is to preserve meaning across frameworks, programs, organizations, and future assurance models, ensuring that each decision-maker can find the information they need within the structure.
Xacta – Built for What’s Next
Xacta is OSCAL-capable with capabilities that extend beyond OSCAL’s structural boundaries. Its strength is its ability to manage security requirements as meaningful information, preserve the relationships among that information, and apply the interpretation and validation needed to support a decision.
Requirements can come from NIST, FedRAMP, an agency, an external framework, an organizational policy, or a newly developed assurance model. Xacta can manage requirements regardless of whether they resemble traditional controls or conform to a predefined OSCAL hierarchy.
![Diagram showing that Xacta is OSCAL-capable and built to be compatible with future requirements]()
Xacta can maintain the relationships among:
- Frameworks, regulations, requirements, and controls
- Systems, components, inheritance, and responsibilities
- Implementation statements, evidence, and automated data
- Test procedures, observations, and assessment results
- Findings, risks, and remediation
- Measures, metrics, verification, and validation
- Mappings across frameworks and assurance models
Xacta uses AI to make those relationships actionable. It can interpret information in context, evaluate it against organization-defined requirements and validation criteria, identify supporting or contradictory evidence, surface gaps, and help produce a defensible result.
Organizations retain responsibility for defining and approving their assurance expectations. AI reduces the manual effort required to interpret and repeatedly validate information as frameworks, evidence, and reporting models change.
This framework and requirement-agnostic foundation allows Xacta to introduce new requirement types, relationships, validation rules, measures, and outputs without forcing a new model to behave like the old one.
However, OSCAL is only one authoritative way Xacta can exchange security information; Xacta supports others and is therefore not locked into OSCAL, making it more future-resilient than platforms that are. FedRAMP 20x schemas provide another set of exchange contracts. Future assurance models will introduce others.
Preserving Meaning and Enabling Adaptability
Xacta’s advantage lies in its ability to preserve the meaning of requirements, evidence, assessments, and decisions—and to express that knowledge in the format each program requires, rather than forcing every requirement into a single schema.
While OSCAL makes security information portable, Xacta makes it meaningful, actionable, and adaptable**.** Xacta goes beyond OSCAL-native, delivering a platform ready to meet future challenges.
Xacta
cyber risk management
cybersecurity
FedRAMP
IT security
NIST
risk management

Stephanie Lacy
Senior Solutions Architect
Stephanie Lacy is a seasoned security subject matter expert (SME) with over 10 years of experience in the cybersecurity field.
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